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Abstract
Systemic risk has remained at the nexus of macrofinancial research and policymaking in most parts of
the world. Much of the attention has focused on
understanding implication of the interconnectedness of
financial markets. Instead of focusing only on
networks, we use and test the utility of network
structures in a novel way. We use RiskRank as a
framework to test the use of networks of financial
systems, and particularly focus on testing the utility of
the network dimension of common exposures (funding
composition and portfolio overlap). RiskRank provides
an ideal playground for testing the extent to which
direct and common exposures perform in capturing
transmission of financial crises. The results in this
paper highlight the importance of common exposures.
We show that funding and portfolio composition
overlap are significant channels of contagion and
should be accounted for when measuring systemic risk.

1. Introduction
The global financial crisis triggered a large number
of efforts on different types of systemic risk (cf. Allen
and Gale, 2000; Acharya, 2009), including macrofinancial imbalances, exogenous aggregate shocks and
contagion risk. While systemic risk is oftentimes
divided into cyclical and cross-sectional components
(Borio, 2011), a plethora of articles have focused on
the latter of the two, i.e., the interconnectedness of
financial systems. This paper postulates, and tests, the
utility of measuring portfolio overlap, as well as tests
to what extent it helps in identifying risks at the
country level.
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Many authors calculate from market prices the
quantiles of the estimated loss probability distribution
of a bank, conditional on the occurrence of an extreme
event in the financial market. Examples of articles
trying to capture systemic risk from market prices
include Acharya et al. (2010), Adrian and
Brunnermeier (2011), Brownlees and Engle (2012),
Acharya et al. (2012), Banulescu and Dumitrescu
(2015) and Hautsch et al. (2014). The above studies
rely on a bivariate approach, which allow calculating
the risk of an institution conditional on another or on a
reference market but does not address the issue of how
risks are transmitted between different institutions in a
multivariate framework. To address the multivariate
nature of systemic risk, a large number of studies have
made use of correlation network models (see, e.g.,
Lorenz et al. (2009); Battiston et al. (2012)). Some
early studies include Billio et al. (2012) and Diebold
and Yilmaz (2014), after which extensions by
Barigozzi and Brownlees (2014) and Ahelegbey et al.
(2016) introduce stochastic graphical models.
In contrast to the literature on correlation networks
that targets the dependence structure in market prices,
this paper measures correlation in network structures.
As pointed out by Brunetti et al. (2015), correlations in
network structures hold promise for assessing common
exposures and complement direct linkages. Giudici et
al. (2017) test measures of common exposures in the
context of market prices, and does not put forward a
generalized approach to this testing framework. This
paper sheds additional light on this problem, in the
context of national interbank markets. Further, this
paper provides a test between direct and common
exposures as a measure of risks prior to financial crises
with a general purpose tool, RiskRank. A large
number of studies have assessed network structures of
interbank markets using the Bank of International
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Settlements (BIS) data set, including Garratt et al.
(2011), Giudici and Spelta (2016), McGuire and
Tarashev (2006), Minoiu and Reyes (2013).
The methodological contribution of this paper is to
formally compare classical networks and correlation
based networks, using appropriate predictive
comparisons. Using the correlation as a measure of
proximity in a multivariate framework, we provide
measures of funding composition and portfolio
similarities. From an applied viewpoint, we shed
further light on the interpretation of country bilateral
financial flows data, contained in the BIS statistics. We
also combine these measures with banking crises, in a
standard early-warning setup, in order to evaluate
whether and to what extent they are related to the
build-up of imbalances prior to crisis events.
Results suggest the predictive power of direct
linkages is clearly outperformed by the other ways of
defining relationships. While linkages based upon
common exposures and a combination of direct and
common exposures perform equally well in forecasting
crisis episodes, the predictive power obtained
combining the two type of network is superior for a
certain parameter range. This highlights the importance
of common exposures. From an economic point of
view, this clearly shows that common exposures, or socalled funding/portfolio composition overlap, indeed
are channels of contagion and should be accounted for
when measuring systemic risk.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2
introduces the portfolio overlap methods used and
Section 3 the crisis signaling and signal evaluation
methods adopted. While Section 4 describes the
empirical exercise in the network structure, Section 5
presents the results of comparing our exposure
measures in terms of performance in signaling a crisis
through the RiskRank measure. Finally, Section 6
contains some concluding remarks and future research
directions.

2.

Networks
methodology

and

portfolio

overlap

This section presents the methods used for
estimating portfolio overlap. We can represent a
network by the means of a graph G=(V;E) consisting
of a set V of $n$ vertices and a set E of m edges. A
weight wi,j, (with i,j=1,...,m) can possibly be associated
to each edge (i;j) and then a weighted (or valued)
graph is defined.
After the recent crisis, it has been argued that
network theory will enhance the understanding of
financial systems, systemic risk, and the

comprehension of the factors causing failures in
financial markets. Usually, the financial systems are
approached studying the connections among financial
institutions. This is done through measuring banking
liabilities and claims because credit interlinkages are
inherently important for propagating, absorbing or
magnifying shocks. Even if a topology of a network is
known to play a major role in robustness against
shocks, the lack of bilateral data have prevented the
systematical investigation of the topological properties
of the international financial network. Always when
data are missing or confidential, correlation based
networks seem to be a better alternative to classical
network models. While the literature has focused on
dependence structures among market prices, the focus
in this paper is on correlations in network structures.
Correlation networks can be used when analyzing
the structure of pairwise correlations among a set of N
time series. The proximity measure is defined as
follows:

(1)
where Ci,j is the correlation coefficient between the
two time series si and sj in a given time window. The
topological analysis of the international financial
network needs to be developed. In order to do so we
will use the following procedure: we will associate
different the time series with the different nodes of a
network. Each pair of nodes can be thought to be
connected by an edge, with weights that can be related
to the correlation coefficient between the two
corresponding time series. A proximity network of n
nodes can be derived by its associated n × n matrix of
proximities D a weighted adjacency matrix, with
elements di,j described by equation 1. Now the network
is obtained and the following step is to describe a node
centrality with an interconnectedness summary
measure. This task is done to describe and to provide
an indicator that can act as a measure of systemic
importance.
In this paper, the set of nodes represent countries,
while the set of edges depends on value that defines the
link. The aim of the paper is to study and to compare
networks of direct flows between countries' banking
sectors with common exposure networks based on
correlations between streams of loans. A link between
two countries in a direct network represents a flow of
funds, in millions of dollars, between a borrower and a
lender. A link in a common exposure network, instead,
measures the similarity between the funding
composition or between the portfolio allocations of two
countries, depending on whether in-flows or out-flows
are used to compute the correlations. While in a direct
network the links are directional, from a lender to a
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borrower, in common exposure networks they are
undirected, and they are computed starting from the
correlation between the in-flows and out-flows of a
country with respect to all other countries.

3. Crisis signaling and signal evaluation
methodology
It is possible to use standard approaches from crisis
signaling with the purpose of testing to what extent
direct and indirect exposures affects the overall level of
stress in the banking sector. Crisis signaling and Earlywarning models are used to divide economies into precrisis and tranquil ones. This will result into a twoclass classification problem, which is a generic
problem formulation in machine learning. We are
aiming for a model that separates vulnerable and
tranquil classes to discriminate between them by
estimating the probability of being in a vulnerable
state. It is also important to take into consideration the
time-series dimension, when testing the predictive
power of the models. Therefore, recursive real-time
out-of-sample tests to assess performance will be
taken. This implies that a new model is created at each
quarter using the information available then. We need
also to consider publication lags and the information in
a realistic manner.

Table 1. A contingency matrix

In order to have comparable results, we will use the
evaluation framework for early-warning models in
(Sarlin, 2013), and mimicking an ideal leading
indicator
for observation n (where
n=1,2,...,N) and forecast horizon h, meaning that we
have a binary indicator that is one during vulnerable
periods and zero otherwise. For detecting events Cn,
we will use a continuous measure indicating
membership in a vulnerable state
. We will
then change it into a binary prediction Bn that takes the
value one if pn exceeds a specified threshold
and zero otherwise. The relationship between
the prediction Bn and the ideal leading indicator Cn can
then be summarized into a contingency matrix, as
found in Table 1. In terms of the elements of the
contingency matrix, we can differentiate between two
different types of classification errors that a decision

maker may be concerned with: missing crises and
issuing false alarms. The next step is to define the
concepts of usefulness and relative usefulness for the
classification performance (as found in Sarlin, 2013).
The process will define type I errors (the share of
missed crises to the frequency of crises, i.e.
T1=FN/(FN+TP)) and type II errors (the share of
issued false alarms to the frequency of tranquil periods,
i.e. T2=FP/(TN+FP)). The following step is to obtain
the policymakers' relative preference between type I
and II errors (μ) to account for the potentially
imbalanced costs of errors and the unconditional
probabilities of crises P1 and tranquil periods P2 to
account for the potential difference in the size of the
two classes. Based on these values, we can define the
loss function as:

(2)
The absolute usefulness of the model can be specified
by comparing it to using the best guess of a
policymaker (always or never signaling depending on
class frequency and preferences):

(3)
The final step is to calculate Ur and to compare the
absolute usefulness of the model to the absolute
usefulness of a model with perfect performance L(μ)=0
We also strive to assess the predictive performance
through calculating standard measures from the
classification and machine learning literature, using the
area under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC)
curve (AUC). These measures take into consideration
the preferences of a policymaker as well as more
general-purpose
measures
to
assess
model
performance. Other performance measures to be used
in assessing the model include: (i) precision of signals
TP/(FP+TP); this is the share of correct signals to the
frequency of signals; (ii) precision of tranquil
predictions TN/(FN+TN), i.e. the share of correct
silence in tranquil times to the frequency of predicting
tranquil time; (iii) recall of signals TP/(FN+TP), i.e.
the share of correct signals to the frequency of crisis
times; (iv) recall of tranquil predictions TN/(FP+TN),
i.e. the share of correct silence in tranquil times to the
frequency of tranquil times; (v) accuracy of the model
TP+TN/(FN+FP+TN+TP), i.e. the share of correct
classifications.

4. Network data calculations
This section compares the use of direct exposures
with common exposures in a predictive model of
systemic banking crises. In short, we let vulnerability
pass-through networks, where links are defined as
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direct and common exposures, and compare their
predictive performance. To start with, we introduce
crisis signaling as a task as well as an evaluation
exercises around the task. Then, we move ahead to an
empirical investigation of European crises.
For networks, the main data source in this paper is
statistics from the Bank of International Settlements
(BIS). The International Banking Statistics comprises
consolidated banking statistics (CBS). CBS capture
worldwide consolidated claims of banks headquartered
in many countries, including claims of their own
foreign affiliates but excluding interoffice positions.
The dataset above is based upon measures used by
banks from their internal risk management systems.
This dataset typically include data on off-balance sheet
exposures (risk transfers, guarantees and credit
commitments).
We employ the consolidated banking statistics on
ultimate risk basis that are based on the country where
the ultimate risk or obligor resides, after taking into
account risk transfers. We have also taken into
consideration the fact that the statistics capture
worldwide consolidated positions of the banks thus, the
CBS reporting area is not synonymous of the location
of the banking offices within the dataset. A reporting
country should consolidate the positions of all banking
entities controlled by a parent institution located in the
reporting country, thus including banking entities
which are actually domiciled elsewhere. With reporting
institutions we mean the financial institutions whose
business is to receive deposits, or close substitutes for
deposits, and to grant credits or invest in securities on
their own account. In this way, the set of reporting
institutions should include not only commercial banks
but also savings banks, credit unions or cooperative
credit banks, as well as other financial credit
institutions. There is a complicated aspect in the fact
that a number of countries do not report their statistics
on the asset side (out-flows); we have 15 fully
reporting countries and more than 240 that do not
report in our dataset. Another complicating factor is
found in the time series with varying starting dates and
of missing values. Therefore we split the analysis of
the in- and out-flows in two different databases. We
restrict the analysis to the 33 largest economies in the
funding side (for which the received loans sum up to
last 100000 billion dollars for the period from 1998 to
2013). The time period starts from the third quarter of
1998 (Q3--1998) to the last quarter of 2013 (Q4-2013). We are forced to use only 15 reporting countries
on the investment side, from the third quarter of 1998
(Q3--1998) to the last quarter of 2013 (Q4-2013). The
countries selected for in-flows analysis are the
following: AT = Austria, AU = Australia, BE =
Belgium, BR = Brazil, CA = Canada, CH =

Switzerland, CN = Cina, CZ = Czech Republic, DE =
Germany, DK = Denmark, ES = Spain, FI = Finalnd,
FR = France, GB = Great Britain, GR = Greece, HK =
Hong Kong, IE = Ireland, IN = India, IT = Italy, JP =
Japan, KR = South Korea, KY = Cayman Islands, LU
= Luxemburg, MX = Mexico, NL = The Netherlands,
NO = Norway, NZ = New Zeland, PL = Poland, PT =
Portugal, RU = Russia, SE = Sweden, SG = Singapore,
US = United State. The countries selected for out-flows
analysis are the following: AT = Austria, AU =
Australia, BE = Belgium, CH = Switzerland, DE =
Germany, DK = Denmark, ES = Spain, FR = France,
GB = Great Britain, IE = Ireland, JP = Japan, NL =
The Netherlands, SE = Sweden, TW = Taiwan, US =
United States. Notice that the proposed strategy is
consistent with Basel III regulation that look separately
at the lending and borrowing sides of banks' balance
sheet in the process of evaluating the systemic
importance (Board, 2013).

5.

Results - Comparing networks with

RiskRank
In this section, we compare direct and indirect
exposures with the RiskRank measure (Mezei and
Sarlin, 2016). RiskRank uses two inputs: individual
risk for a set of economies measured by an earlywarning model and interconnectedness across these
economies. Essentially, this allows measuring the
vulnerability of an individual economy, accounting for
both domestic risk as well as risk stemming from
exposures to other economies. In this exercise, the
early-warning model follows the approach in
(Holopainen and Sarlin, 2016). For an early-warning
model, we need two types of data: crisis events and
vulnerability indicators. The crisis events are based
upon the IMF database by \cite{laeven2013systemic},
while the vulnerability indicators used include most
common measures of widespread imbalances, such as
excessive credit growth, excessive increases in stock
and house prices, GDP growth, loans to deposits and
debt service ratio, as well as more structural indicators,
such as government debt, current account deficits and
inflation. We use a standard logit model with 14
macro-financial indicators for 15 European economies
and a forecast horizon of 5--12 quarters prior to crisis
events, as is common in the literature. The network
dimension is measured with BIS International Banking
Statistics in three ways: direct, indirect (common
exposures) and combined exposures. This provides
ample means to compare the three types of networks.
RiskRank provides a risk measure that combines
measures of individual risk and interconnectedness. In
principle, it is nothing else than an aggregation

Page 1360

operator for each entity c that aggregates over node
values (i.e., individual risk) over link values (i.e.,
interconnectedness). Thus, we can write RiskRank as
follows:

(4)
where c is the evaluated node and xc is its associated
node value. In this case, the nodes are countries and
their values crisis probabilities. Further, I(ci,cj) stands
for the link between nodes i and j and v(ci) stands for
the Shapley-index (average contribution of fixed
element xi in any subset).

In the following the results of the RiskRank
comparisons are given (Tables 2-9). Note that the
tables reports recursive out-of-sample performance for
the direct network with a forecast horizon of 5-12
quarters. The table reports in columns the following
measures to assess the overall performance of the
models: preferences (μ), optimal threshold (τ), absolute
(Ua) and relative (Ur) usefulness, and AUC = area
under the ROC curve (TP rate to FP rate), TP = True
positives, FP = False positives, TN = True negatives,
FN = False negatives, Precision of positives (PP) =
TP/(TP+FP), Recall of positives (RP) = TP/(TP+FN),
Precision of negatives (PN) = TN/(TN+FN), Recall of
negatives (RN) = TN/(TN+FP), Accuracy (Acc.) =
(TP+TN)/(TP+TN+FP+FN).

Table 2. Predictive performance without networks (with countries selected for the in-flows analysis).

Table 3. Predictive performance of the direct network (with countries selected for the in-flows analysis).
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Table 4. Predictive performance of the funding composition similarity network.

Table 5. Predictive performance of the combined network for in-flows.

Table 6. Predictive performance without network (with countries selected for out-flows analysis).
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Table 7. Predictive performance of the direct network (with countries selected for out-flows analysis).

Table 8. Predictive performance of the portfolio similarity network.
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Table 9. Predictive performance of the combined network for out-flows.

4. Conclusion and future work

5. References

Measuring portfolio similarity is a central task
when modeling systemic risk and interconnectedness
in financial systems, particularly for complementing
measures based upon direct exposures. Systemic risk,
in itself, concerns the risks posed by balance sheet
relationships and interdependencies among players in a
system or market, where the failure of a single entity
can cause a cascading failure, which could potentially
bring down an entire system or market. These balance
sheet linkages can be represented by a network that
describes the mutual relationships between the
different economical agents involved. In this paper, we
have focused on measuring portfolio overlap, and
assessing the utility of common exposures as a channel
for transmission effects. In our contribution we have
also shown that correlation network models that aim at
capturing the multivariate network structure provide
suitable means for representing the indirect dimension
of systemic risk through common exposures. We have
combined our proposed measures with banking crises
data, in order to assess whether and to what extent they
are related to the build-up of imbalances prior to crisis
events. The exercise clearly shows that common
exposures are an important channel of contagion and
should be accounted for when measuring systemic risk.
Future work should cover general development of
the RiskRank approach to also incorporate dynamic
iterations and feedback effects. For the specific
purpose in this paper, one could also think of various
other types of network linkages that could be used for
measuring the efficacy of transmission channels.
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